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On the Security of Information Dissemination in the
Internet-of-Vehicles
Danda B. Rawat , Moses Garuba, Lei Chen, and Qing Yang
Abstract: Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is regarded as an emerging paradigm for connected vehicles to exchange
their information with other vehicles using vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications by forming a vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANETs), with roadside units using vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) communications. IoV offers several
beneﬁts such as road safety, trafﬁc efﬁciency, and infotainment by forwarding up-to-date trafﬁc information about
upcoming trafﬁc. For instance, IoV is regarded as a technology that could help reduce the number of deaths caused
by road accidents, and reduce fuel costs and travel time on the road. Vehicles could rapidly learn about the road
condition and promptly respond and notify drivers for making informed decisions. However, malicious users in
IoV may mislead the whole communications and create chaos on the road. Data falsiﬁcation attack is one of the
main security issues in IoV where vehicles rely on information received from other peers/vehicles. In this paper,
we present data falsiﬁcation attack detection using hashes for enhancing network security and performance by
adapting contention window size to forward accurate information to the neighboring vehicles in a timely manner (to
improve throughput while reducing end-to-end delay). We also present clustering approach to reduce travel time
in case of trafﬁc congestion. Performance of the proposed approach is evaluated using numerical results obtained
from simulations. We found that the proposed adaptive approach prevents IoV from data falsiﬁcation attacks and
provides higher throughput with lower delay.
Key words: Internet of Vehicles (IoV); VANET security; IoV security; VANET; data falsiﬁcation attacks
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Introduction

The data released by the National Highway Trafﬁc
Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 2014 show a total
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number of 32 675 fatal crashes in the United States.
It can also be found in the same set of data that 2.3
million injuries from vehicle accidents were reported in
the same year[1] . In addition to lives and injuries, two
other major losses on road are time and cost of fuel,
which are typical in cities and metropolitan areas where
commuters suffer from great amount of time loss due to
trafﬁc congestion and road conditions during peak time
for their weekday commuting. A study released in 2015
by the Texas A&M Transportation Institute indicates
that annually the U.S. suffers a loss of $140 million
due to time and fuel wasted in trafﬁc congestion, and
on average each commuter spends an extra 42 hours
and wastes 19 gallons of fuel caused by trafﬁc and
road conditions[2] . These problems could be reduced
or minimized by implementing communications in IoV
for exchanging trafﬁc information. Speciﬁcally, IoV is
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meant to be primarily for improving road safety, trafﬁc
efﬁciency, and infotainment applications on the road
where vehicles transmit and receive critical roadway
and trafﬁc updates based on their current travel route
and information received from surrounding vehicles and
roadside units.
To support vehicular communications using V2V and
V2R, there is a Dedicated Short Range Communication
(DSRC) enabled IEEE 802.11p technology that allows
On Board Units (OBUs) exchange information using
vehicular networks in IoV. In IoV, private information
of owners/drivers/renters is directly linked to vehicles.
Security and privacy-aware communications are
essential components to protect IoV and concerned
authorities. Falsiﬁed data transmitted over the VANET
can be detrimental to lives of drivers and passengers.
In this paper, we investigate data manipulation attack
in IoV for enhancing overall throughput and reducing
end-to-end delay during information dissemination.
Related work: Recent related works include
cryptographic hash chains to authenticate IoV users[3, 4] ,
trust-based security to protect vehicular network[4, 5] ,
location-based vehicular security[4, 6, 7] , security
through third party authentication[8] , security through
signature-based authentication[9] , security using
cryptographic technique[10] , and enhancing VANET
performance/throughput[4, 11–15] . Other approaches for
vehicular network security have been surveyed in
Ref. [16] (for further details about different security
approaches, please refer to Refs. [4, 16] and references
therein). None of these existing techniques consider
mitigating data manipulating attacks to enhance overall
throughput while reducing overall end-to-end delay.
Our contributions: We propose to use adaptive
contention window to enhance network throughput
in case of data falsiﬁcation attacks in the network
and hash chain to validate messages to mitigate datafalsiﬁcation attacks. We further investigate a clustering
algorithm for vehicular networks in IoV for reducing
waiting/congestion time in case of trafﬁc jams where
vehicles make announcements about their candidacy
for cluster head. The cluster head is chosen based on
geolocation, trust level, and the number of neighbors
that the vehicle has during the polling process. Cluster
head is responsible for making decision about when to
communicate with other clusters and when to reduce the
contention window where needed. Because of hashing
bits (say bh ), there will be communication overhead
but it is negligible compared to the beneﬁt it offers
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and reduction in delay because of adjustment of the
contention window. Note that bh is very very small
compared to the size of the message SP (i.e., SP << bh )
bh
and thus the overhead ratio
will be very small.
SP
Paper organization: The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the system
model. Section 3 presents the proposed solution with
formal analysis. Numerical results obtained from Monte
Carlo simulation are presented in Section 4. Finally
conclusions are presented in Section 5.

2

System Model

A typical system model for IoV considered in this
paper is depicted in Fig. 1 where both V2V and
V2R communications are used to forward trafﬁc
information. We consider that when there are only a
few vehicles, Road Side Units (RSUs) help to reach
out the vehicles. When there are enough vehicles for
V2V communications, they communicate directly using
single hop or multi-hop communications. Furthermore,
in case of high vehicle density, V2V is sufﬁcient to
relay the information in IoV. However, in case of
sparse vehicular network, there might not be sufﬁcient
vehicles for relaying the information, thus V2R and
R2V communications are needed.
In IoV, we assume that a source vehicle sends
information with its hash value. Each vehicle that
receives the information calculates a hash value locally
based on the received message. This locally computed
hash value is compared against the hash value sent
by the source vehicle. In single hop or multi-hop
communications for IoV, when a vehicle ﬁnds any
discrepancies in hash values, it stops forwarding the
compromised information to other vehicles. In this
case, information has to be re-transmitted by the
source vehicle. To compensate this delay introduced
by the retransmission, we proposed contention window
reduction for vehicles so that waiting for channel









Fig. 1 Internet of Vehicles with a source vehicle (v1 ),
relay nodes/vehicles (v2 , v3 , and v4 ), road-side-unit and
a destination v5 where vehicle v1 and vehicle v5 are not
reachable using single hop and thus they rely on multi-hop
communications.
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access opportunities for message transmission could be
reduced.
Note that two vehicles, or vehicles and roadside units
are assumed to be within the communication range if
their communication ranges are overlapped, that is
Rmin < Di;j .t /  Ri
(1)
and the probability of two nodes being within the
communication range is expressed as
Pr.CR/ D PrfRmin < Di;j .t /  Ri g
(2)
where Rmin is the minimum separation distance
between two nodes (two vehicles or vehicle and RSU)
in IoV, Ri is the maximum transmission range that
is allowed in vehicular communications (for instance,
1000 meters in IEEE 802.11p DSRC enabled VANET).
Note that the RSU is treated as a stationary
vehicle/node with zero speed .v D 0/. When there
are enough vehicles present in the network, the relaying
vehicle forwards both the data and its hash to all
vehicles within its range including the RSU.

3
3.1

Proposed Approach
Clustering in IoV and drive-time saving
through detouring

Congested trafﬁc results in a sudden decrease of
drivable path-ways for vehicles on the road. In order to
accurately and promptly exchange information among
vehicles and save time and costs, we postulate and
examine the probability of drivers being able and
willing to take a detour from their original route when
the projected time for passing through the trafﬁc via the
original route is greater than that of the detour. As the
number of surrounding vehicles increases, the expected
time to be spent by the drivers for slowly moving and/or
completely stopping will be gradually increased. Thus
based on the location of vehicles and location of exits
on the road, vehicles on the road can be divided into
multiple groups or clusters. Such as Groups A, B, and
C in Fig. 2, based on how close they are approaching
to an event or incident on the road and how close to the
highway exists. In this scenario, Group A is the front
group and is closest to the incident and is expected to
experience the least of travel time among all groups,
while Group C at the end of the growing queue is
expected to see longer travel time through the trafﬁc
ahead. However, Group A has no choice but wait until
the wrecked cars are removed. Groups B and C have
choices to take exits as shown in Fig. 2. If vehicles in
Group B take exits, by the time vehicles of Group C get
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Fig. 2 Clustering in Internet of Vehicles based on how close
they are approaching to an event or incident on the road and
how close to the highway exists.

to the location of Group B, the road could possibly be
cleared.
Based on the above modeling, we present the trafﬁc
scenario as an “inchworm”[17, 18] . During trafﬁc peak
time, and in the event or incident such as sports
events and trafﬁc accidents, the queue of vehicles
can be observed as multiple groups A, B, C, D, etc.
The number of vehicles in a group can be random,
unless constraints exist, e.g., same queue divided into
more groups may potentially increase the amount of
communication in the IoV. In Fig. 2, at the instant of
stopped trafﬁc (e.g., around vehicle Group A), there
will be a ripple motion causing all vehicles in Groups A
through C to slow down, leading to the happening of the
“inch worm” effect. Consequently each forthcoming
vehicle group will have to slow down and all groups
have to wait until they slowly move and pass the root
cause point of the trafﬁc. It can be assumed that Group
A will be close enough to the incident that any amount
of detour time will not be beneﬁcial to them, while
groups behind Group A will be increasingly beneﬁcial
by detouring as farther away from the start of the queue.
In the case that some drivers in any groups decide
to reroute and take the detour (when such detouring
exists), all vehicles behind them will have a more open
route while vehicles ahead of them will still be moving
through the obstruction in the case when rerouting is not
worthwhile for these vehicles. By enforcing rerouting
as soon as changes to the queue occur, it is expected
that all recent incoming trafﬁc will only slightly be
or not be slowed down at all by the event. Here we
give an example scenario to further explain how making
decision of detouring may affect the overall travel time.
Suppose the travel time for vehicles in Groups B and C
extends to 30 minutes due to the congestion, while the
detour only takes 20 minutes. In this case it is possible
some of the drivers may decide to take the detour but
the others may not. In the scenario that most would take
the detour, the trafﬁc ahead of a new Group D may see
an update with reduced travel time, e.g., from 45 to 60
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minutes down to 20 to 30 minutes. As in Fig. 2, where
Group B takes the detour and frees up the trafﬁc in the
main pathway where the accident happened, Group C
will expect reduced travel time due to the detour of
vehicles ahead of that group.
Performance Evaluation: We have considered two
simulation scenarios: (1) one similar to the one given
in Fig. 2 where enough vehicles were present to form
vehicular clusters/groups and there were two exits
for two groups (Group B and Group C) of vehicles.
However, there was no option to reroute for vehicles
in Group A. (2) The other scenario had enough vehicles
to form groups (Groups A, B, and C) but no group had
an option to take exits. Figure 3 shows the variation
of estimated delay time to reach a given destination
for a typical scenario with and without an alternative
route for vehicle clusters B and C considered in our
analysis where there is an accident in front of the
cluster/Group A. For Group A, there is no alternative
route, thus the waiting time or delay is same for both
cases. However, for Group B and Group C, there are
alternative routes, thus the delays to reach to a given
destination (or waiting times) for these vehicles are
smaller when there is alternative route than that of when
there is no alternative route.
The information dissemination in IoV should happen
as quickly as possible and as securely as possible. We
propose hash-based detection of false data injection
attack and a process of reducing contention window
to compensate the delay introduced by the false data
detection process. Hashing and contention window
adaptation approach is discussed in the following
section.

Fig. 3 Variation of estimated delay time to reach the
destination for a typical scenario with and without an
alternative route for vehicle clusters B and C.
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3.2

Hashing and delay

As discussed in the system model, each vehicle
computes hash values based on the received information
and compares the calculated hash value with the hash
value transmitted by the source vehicle (as in Fig. 4).
By comparing these two hash values, each vehicle can
detect data falsifying attacks if there was any tempering
in the message.
Hashing is one of the effective methods for
securing vehicular communication in IoV as it is
computationally less complex and easier to implement
for highly dynamic IoV environment. In Fig. 1, source
vehicle v1 sends data packets M to destination (vehicle
v5 ), either through direct transmission if the node
is present within its transmission range or through a
multiple hop using relay nodes (1; 2; :::; i; :::; N ) or
directly through the RSU if present within its range.
The message M and its hash value is transmitted. At
each node, data packet takes the time i , i.e.,
(3)
i D .ıi C CWi C 'i /.1  Pr(CR)/
where i time comprises of processing time ıi for hash
calculation, contention window CW time for channel
access, and the wait time 'i for which a node waits
to receive the data from another relay path. When the
hash of the message M is sent over to the .i C 1/ node,
computed hash value is compared with the transmitted
hash value from the source node. With using hash
chains the tampered data will have a completely
different hash whereas an un-tampered packet will have
the exact same hash value as the hash sent by the

Fig. 4 Hash values computed by the message source vehicle
(which is transmitted with the message) and by the m-th
vehicle are compared to decide whether the message should
be forwarded or not in IoV. Note that the message in IoV
should be delivered to all vehicles but it should be validated
for its legitimacy.
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source vehicle. So using this kind of authentication,
false messages can be easily differentiated by the hash
message relayed across the network. Prior to data
transmission the source node checks if the destination
node is within communication ranges, if not, it looks
for relay nodes or RSU within its transmission range.
If the nodes are within each others’ transmitting range,
time period for which the nodes would remain within
range is calculated based on relative velocity (Vrel ) and
their Transmission Range (TR) as
TR
(4)
T D
Vrel
To completely transmit the SP size of the information,
following condition should be satisﬁed.
SP
TR
C i

(5)
Vrel
B
where SP is the size of the data being transmitted with
data rate B (bps) in IoV.
3.3

Adaptation of contention window size

In IoV, each vehicle computes hash value upon
receiving data and compares the locally computed hash
value with the hash value transmitted by the source. If
these hash values do not match, that is, hash (M at
node 1/ ¤ hash .M at node m/ say at node m, then
the m-th node will recognize that the message sent by
the previous node is malicious. When data packets
are tampered from an attack in a relay path, the node
will look for the same untempered data packet from
another relay path or from RSU. This will add a certain
amount of delay in data transmission. To compensate
this delay, reducing the contention window times of
the nodes present after m-th node (or all nodes in the
cluster where the m-th node is located) will help reduce
the delay in the network. The adaptation of contention
window size is carried
8 out as
< CWmC1 ; if h ¤ h I
m
1
CWmC1 D
(6)
2
:CW
if hm D h1
mC1 ;
where the hash hm D hash.M / at node m and
hash h1 D hash.M / at source node i D 1 and when
malicious attacker is present then node i is denoted
as m D i. Note that if there is no any malicious user
present along the relay path, nodes would communicate
without any reduction in the CW sizes.
In the process of sending data packets through N
relay nodes, we deﬁne the probability for a data packet
M at the i -th node to hop to the .i C 1/-th node as
Pxy D P ŒM is accurate at .i C 1/jM was accurate at i 
(7)
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Using Pxy , the probability to successfully transmit
data from the source-to-destination is calculated using
Markov chain 1-step state transition probability as
N
X
P .N / D
P .i /Pxy
(8)
iD1

where P .i / is the probability that the data is at the i-th
node at a given time. The resulting probability P .N /
is the probability that data M will reach its destination
node without any discrepancies. However, when an
attacker is present in the relay path, the transmitted
message will have to be stopped from transmission.
The probability that message would be transmitted with
modiﬁcation because of an attacker can be deﬁned as
P .A/ D 1  P .N /
(9)
Note that the paper does not consider data loss due
to interference, shadowing, fading, etc., which is out of
the scope of the work. When an attacker is detected
through hashing process, the data is dropped from
further propagation in the VANET.
3.4

Throughput and delay analysis

The total time spent for the data packet in the network
is denoted by Ta when the m-th node to be a malicious,
that is,
m
m
X
X
.ıi C CWi C 'i /.1  Pri .CR// D
i ;
Ta D
i D1

i D1

m 2 f1; 2; :::; N g
(10)
If the attacker at the m-th node is detected, the
contention window of the .m C 1/-th node CWmC1 is
reduced to half of its original size. This node waits for
legitimate packet from another route or node. The time
spent at each node for a data packet until it reaches the
destination from .m C 1/-th node is expressed as
N
N
X
X
0
0
0
.ıi C CWi C 'i /.Pri .CR// D
0i
Tb D
i DmC1

i DmC1

(11)
The throughput is computed through the computation
speciﬁed in Ref. [11]. However, we have modiﬁed the
equation to accommodate the presence of malicious
users and also incorporate the contention window wait
times into the equation. Based on these parameters, endto-end throughput  of the network is computed as
P .N /ŒTa C Tb 
D
(12)
ŒP .N /Ta C P .A/Tb 
Then the network delay is calculated as
(13)
d D ŒTi;iC1 .N C 1/ C Ta C P .A/Tb
where Ti;i C1 is the propagation time for the message
between two consecutive nodes i and i C 1.
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4

Performance Evaluation and Discussion

To corroborate our analysis presented in the previous
section, we have performed Monte Carlo simulations
where source and destination vehicles are not reachable
directly using single hop and there are multiple
relay paths using multi-hop communications (in dense
network scenario) and/or roadside unit communications
(in sparse network scenario). Each vehicle is assumed
to be equipped with DSRC/WAVE enabled 802.11p
computing and communication devices. Speeds of
the vehicles were assumed to be between 25 mph
and 70 mph that covers the most city and highway
speed limits. For simulation setup, we have considered
three scenarios: (1) without any data falsiﬁcation or
manipulation attacks, (2) with data falsiﬁcation attack
along the relay path where attack was detected and CW
size was adapted, and (3) with data falsiﬁcation attack
where attack was detected and CW size was not adapted
(kept ﬁxed).
First, we have plotted the variation of expected
normalized throughput vs. the connectivity probability
(for source and destination vehicles) as shown in
Fig. 5. When the probability of connectivity increases,
the throughput increases for IoV as shown in
Fig. 5. Furthermore, we observed that the throughput
is lower in case of attacks where vehicles had to
wait longer to transmit accurate information. When
attack was detected, the given vehicle dropped the
packet and waited for an accurate copy of the
message from another path or another node/vehicle
and then forwarded the accurate copy of the message
but with lower contention window size for channel
opportunities. When contention window was adapted,

Fig. 5 Variation of normalized throughput vs. the
connectivity probability Pr(CR).
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throughput was higher than the case without adaptation
of contention window as in Fig. 5. Note that for
the data manipulation/falsiﬁcation attacks, intermediate
vehicle(s) changed the message to mislead the vehicular
communications.
We have also plotted the variation of expected endto-end delay vs. the probability of connectivity (for
source and destination vehicles) as shown in Fig. 6 for
three different scenarios. We observed that the end-toend delay is decreasing with increasing probability of
connectivity as shown in Fig. 6.
The end-to-end delay is the highest in case of attack
when contention window was not adapted after attack.
The delay is lower in the case of contention window
adaptation than that of ﬁx contention window as shown
in Fig. 6. Note that, as expected, the end-to-end delay
is the least in case of no data falsiﬁcation attack in the
network as shown in Fig. 6.
Next, we simulated three scenarios (without any data
falsiﬁcation attacks, with data falsiﬁcation attack in the
middle of relay chain where attack was detected and
CW size was adapted, and with data falsiﬁcation attack
in the middle of relay chain where attack was detected
and CW size was not adapted) and have plotted the
variation of average throughput vs. the simulation time
as shown in Fig. 7. We observed that the throughput
is increasing with the time as shown in Fig. 7 when
there is no data manipulation or falsiﬁcation attack in
the network. The throughput is higher when attack
was detected and CW size was adapted than that of
ﬁxed CW size as shown in Fig. 7. Furthermore, the
throughput is the highest when there is no attack in the

Fig. 6 Expected end-to-end delay vs. the connectivity
probability Pr(CR).
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Fig. 7 Variation of normalized throughput vs. the
simulation time after an attack around halfway.

network as shown in Fig. 7.
For all these three scenarios, we have plotted the
expected end-to-end delay as shown in Fig. 8. We found
that the delay is highest when data falsiﬁcation attack
is detected but CW size was not adapted and the delay
is the lowest when there is no attack in the IoV. When
data falsiﬁcation attack was detected and CW size was
adapted, the end-to-end delay gets reduced as shown in
Fig. 8.
It can be concluded from above results and analysis
that the adaptation of contention window size when
attack is detected can help compensate/reduce the
delay (introduced by the data falsiﬁcation attack) while
increasing the throughput in the vehicular network.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented data falsiﬁcation
attack detection using hashes for improving network
security and enhancing the overall performance by

adapting contention window size while forwarding
accurate information to the neighboring vehicles in a
timely manner (to improve throughput while reducing
end-to-end delay). We have also presented clustering
approach to reduce travel delay time in case of
trafﬁc congestion. Performance evaluation is done by
using numerical results obtained from Monte Carlo
simulations. We observed that the contention window
adaptation once data manipulation attack is detected
results in lower delay and higher throughput than that
of ﬁxed contention window size. Furthermore, when
accurate information is transmitted to vehicles, they
could make informed decision to reduce their waiting
time when alternative routes are available.
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